Where does the universality of science lie between positivism and relativism?

Compare the positivist and relativist perspectives on the universality of science and explain why the author cannot accept a relativistic view of science. Emphasize that the universal standards of positivism are essential for the progress of science, and discuss the limitations of the relativistic view.

 

“The modern age is an age in which science is highly valued.” So begins the introduction to A.F. Charmus’s Modern Philosophy of Science, published in 1985. But has science always been as highly valued as we now think it is? Sadly, the answer is no. Science was often undervalued in times dominated by religious and metaphysical values, only to be elevated later when its value was experimentally proven. Examples include Copernicus’ theories and Mendel’s theories of genetics. Just as the way we view science is influenced by the times, the same science can be viewed very differently depending on the experience and values of the scholar. In this article, I will discuss two opposing views of the universality of science and explain why I cannot accept a relativistic view of science.
When we think of “science”, the first characteristic that comes to mind is “universality”. We need a universal standard of understanding for all scientific situations, and this universality is inevitable because science claims objectivity as its most important value. Indeed, logical positivists such as Karl Popper identified this universality and non-historicality as a requirement for science. However, A.F. Charmus refutes this positivism. Instead, he argues for relativism, the idea that there are no absolutely correct truths, and that correctness depends on the criteria by which we judge them. Charmus argues that there are no universal standards in science, and that historically successful practices are inherently contingent. However, I believe that these contingent criteria, which ultimately lead to subjective human desires, are illogical.
Take the example of Aristotle’s physics and Galileo’s physics. If we judge their physics based on Charmus’s relativism, it is impossible to decide which one is better because Aristotle’s physics contains Aristotelian criteria and Galileo’s physics contains Galilean criteria. On the other hand, if we want to claim that Galileo’s physics is more advanced compared to Aristotle’s, as everyone agrees, we need a standard that can be applied to both theories. This is where the limitations of a relativistic view of science come into play. It makes it impossible to make value judgments about scientific theories, which inhibits progress through failure. Of course, the paradigm through which we view science as a discipline may change over time, but ultimately, the natural environment that science seeks to study remains constant. Therefore, in order for science to progress, it needs an absolute standard, and Charmus’s relativistic viewpoint is bound to stifle progress.
Universality is also exemplified in Karl Popper’s anti-proofism. Karl Popper, a logical positivist and advocate of critical rationalism, presented disprovability as the most important aspect of science. The idea is that hypotheses and theories are constantly being tested by experimental observation, and that disproved hypotheses and theories are replaced by better theories to advance science. However, in order for a scientific theory to be disproved and a better theory to be judged, there needs to be a super-criterion for judging scientific theories. For example, in the case of geodynamics and pendulum theory, the universal standard that experimental proof through observation is necessary in science was created by positivists, and geodynamics was recognized, while pendulum theory, which was established through metaphysical speculation, was rejected. However, if, as Charmus argued, a contingent standard, or one that is in the eye of the beholder, were applied to science, then both celestial and geodynamic theories would have been recognized as meaningful science and would not have been disprovable. In fact, Charmus refutes geodynamics with the “tower argument,” which calls into question the possibility of disproving it through experimental observation. If geostationarity were true, he argues, a stone dropped from the top of a tower should not fall straight down, but it does, which would disprove experimental geostationarity. Combining his own observations with the experiments of scientists of his time, Charmus defended relativism by arguing that even experiments on a theory can have varying results. However, the experiments had numerous flaws, and if these arguments had been accepted at the time, it is unlikely that the theory would have advanced.
Of course, there are scholars who have defended some of Charmus’s relativism. Thomas Kuhn, author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is one of them. Kuhn posits paradigms in science and argues that there are multiple, pluralistic conceptualizations of science at any given time. Scientific progress is not driven by the accumulation of generalizations derived from observations or the critical testing of new hypotheses, but rather by scientific revolutions that change the way a community of scientists views the world and defines and solves problems. From this relativistic perspective, there is no superior paradigm among the many that exist. In reality, however, the paradigm that is more accepted by many people will be judged superior, and under relativism, every individual will have to follow their own preference. This would lead to a situation where the paradigm that is already in power would remain in power. In my opinion, scientific progress through the existence of pluralistic conceptualizations is a contradiction in terms.
In this blog post, I have compared the interpretations of positivism, relativism, and antipositivism on the topic of universals in science. I have also provided a rationale for why positivism and universal standards are inevitable in science. While the rightness or wrongness of a discipline may be subject to individual judgment, science is not. This is especially true today, when scientific knowledge is often used as a real-world skill. If there is no objective standard that everyone can agree on, the victims of this confusion will be those of us who live closest to science.