How can human cloning violate human dignity and diversity?

This essay critiques Hilary Putnam and John Harris’s conflicting arguments against human cloning and their logic. It explains that they oppose human cloning because it risks creating undesirable expectations of others.

 

Since Ian Wilmut’s creation of Dolly, a cloned sheep, there have been various debates for and against human cloning, as well as various artistic works that allude to the dangers of human cloning, such as Gattaca and Island. As a result, the public has developed a negative image of A.I. and cloning. Hilary Putnam said that the “visceral reaction” to the issue of human cloning is justified, but I think this reaction is somewhat distorted. Generally speaking, keywords that trigger a visceral reaction do not evoke positive images in people. This may be because the aforementioned artworks have had such an impact, and because these topics are still unfamiliar and can make people feel uncomfortable. The answer to the question of whether children born in a society where biotechnology is prevalent will have the visceral reactions we feel is probably no. So, what can be a clearer basis for being for or against human cloning?
In The Genetic Revolution and Bioethics, Hilary Putnam and John Harris make somewhat opposing arguments. Putnam argued against human cloning, while Harris argued in favor. I partially agree and partially disagree with their arguments. However, I disagree with the conclusive basis on which they make their arguments. I will criticize the parts of their arguments that I don’t think are justified, and then finally explain why I oppose human cloning.
First, let’s look at Putnam’s argument. Putnam argues that humans should have a desirable “moral image” of the world. This “moral image” is not a fundamental principle or rule, but a comprehensive and concrete image that emerges from the convergence of many values in human society. In other words, there is a moral image that is not just an abstract ideal or value, but a practical image of human life. Moral images that project the values of human society vary depending on the time period and region, and the value of diversity should be emphasized in moral images. On the other hand, there is a family, which is the most fundamental group before the social group of human beings, and the concept of family image also exists in the family. Similar to the moral image, the family image is a concrete image that represents the various values that make up the family group. Therefore, in order for diversity to be valued in the moral image, diversity must be valued in the more fundamental family image. However, human cloning violates human diversity and should be prohibited at the family level. This is where I think Putnam’s logic for arguing that diversity is necessary at the family level is flawed. The argument that if a value (diversity) is necessary at a lower level (moral), then it is necessary at a higher level (family) is a backwards argument. Rather, even if a value is necessary in the higher concept, it may not be necessary in the lower concept. To argue for the value of diversity in the moral universe, we need to show that diversity is an important value in the family universe. Furthermore, there is no clear standard for what constitutes a desirable moral standard. What is considered desirable by group A may be considered undesirable by group B, and this disagreement has been demonstrated in human society. And I agree with Putnam’s argument that Kant’s maxim that human beings should be treated as ends, not means, should be upheld. However, as Harris argues, it is quite difficult to define the extent of human instrumentalization. It is inconsistent to argue that organ transplantation, which is a mild form of instrumentalization, is legal, but human cloning is not. Therefore, without a specific standard, the logic of supporting mild instrumentalization and opposing severe instrumentalization is inadequate.
Let’s look at Harris’s argument. Harris argues that Kant’s maxim that we should not instrumentalize human beings is correct, but it doesn’t apply to human cloning. For example, it’s inconsistent to argue that blood transfusions are acceptable, but human cloning is not. And Putnam’s argument is that we need diversity in our families, and that diversity can be realized through cloning. Here, Harris suggests that the value of diversity can be realized through human cloning, but I think he is wrong. In any society or era, the aesthetic standards and preferred traits of the majority of people at the time are more or less similar. In this situation, if parents are able to design their children (i.e., choose through cloning), it is natural that many parents will choose the preferred traits that are prevalent at the time, and this choice will reduce diversity. Returning to Harris’s argument, he concludes that ethical issues should be tested by concrete evidence and arguments. And he argues that the reports and laws of many philosophers in favor of human cloning inductively favor human cloning because there is sufficient evidence to support it. However, I do not believe that such reports and laws are a valid basis. If it is reasonable to argue in favor of human cloning inductively because various reports and laws favor human cloning, it is also reasonable to argue against human cloning because of reports and laws that oppose human cloning. Therefore, I believe that Harris’s rationale for human cloning is wrong.
Before I get into my argument, let’s be clear. Imagine a machine that deteriorates psychological relationships with others. In the world, individuals interact with many other people, which can bring them happiness, but also hurt them. It’s normal for people to get hurt and have bad relationships with others. But does this mean that it is desirable to set in motion a machine that allows relationships to deteriorate? Not at all. Evil is inevitable, but it’s not right to choose it. In human society, there are certain values that can be categorized as good or evil, regardless of the situation. Good values include service, happiness, and solidarity, while evil values include hatred, murder, and revenge. Good and evil are values that we naturally feel as human beings, so it is not desirable to pursue good and undesirable to pursue evil. However, if we move beyond the concept of naturalness to the concept of choice, we can say that choosing evil instead of good is evil. The same goes for expectations of others.
I don’t think humans should be raised and nurtured to have certain expectations of others. Of course, there are different kinds of expectations. In the case of raising a child, a parent might expect their child to be healthy, or they might expect their child to fulfill a dream that they couldn’t fulfill themselves. But the expectation I’m talking about here is the expectation of a cloned human. If people were to create cloned humans, what would they do it for? It’s easy to imagine a number of reasons: to see someone they miss, to recreate a once-in-a-millennium genius like Einstein, etc. A cloned human being created for this purpose would be born with the expectation of being an image of someone who already exists (or has existed). While people should grow up and form their own identity, it is a violation of human dignity to grow up with someone else’s image imposed on them. This type of expectation is undesirable. Of course, it is natural to expect someone to be the image of someone who already exists (or has existed). For example, if the first child is well-educated and has excellent physical abilities, parents may expect the second child to have those qualities. However, these are never desirable expectations, and as I said earlier, if you can choose whether or not to have undesirable expectations of a child, you shouldn’t, and the choice of whether or not to clone a human being is a choice of whether or not to have undesirable expectations of a child. Therefore, human cloning should be opposed.
Furthermore, even if human cloning were possible, it would be impossible to create an exact copy. Basically, human cloning involves the nuclear replacement of a fertilized egg with a nucleus containing the DNA of an original human being, which results in identical twins with completely different identities despite having all the same genes. In addition, in the case of human cloning, the mitochondrial genes are different, so the degree of similarity is less than that of identical twins, meaning that it is pointless to expect a cloned human to be identical to the original human when there are so many differences between them. However, if a cloned child were to grow up with the expectation that he or she would look like a specific person who has already been molded, the pain and violation of his or her personality would be severe. In this sense, the argument that “the image of a particular person should not be expected of a new life” is not contrary to Kant’s maxim, which both Putnam and Harris agree with.
It could be argued that the purpose of human cloning is not only to recreate a specific person. However, it’s not fair to argue in favor of human cloning when there are clear risks involved. For example, no parent would play a game that gave them a 50% chance of becoming a billionaire or a 50% chance of their baby dying.
So far, I have criticized Putnam’s and Harris’ arguments and argued what I believe to be the decisive grounds for opposing human cloning. Putnam’s argument against human cloning is based on Kant’s maxim, but his logic is not well-structured to show the value of diversity. Harris, on the other hand, argued for human cloning based on the value of evidence and argumentation, but his logic in favor of human cloning was not convincing because he used inductive methods based on philosophers’ reports and laws. I argued, without violating Kant’s maxim, that humans should not grow up with expectations of what others should be like. It is common for parents to have expectations for their children, but that does not mean that the expected behavior is desirable, and if we have the choice to make human beings do the expected behavior through human cloning, we should choose not to. In this argument, it is possible to oppose human cloning while still enjoying the benefits of life science technologies that do not involve human cloning. As long as we don’t create human beings with dignity, we can receive the gifts of life sciences, such as artificial organs and gene therapy.