How can an internal view of language based on Augustine’s divine illumination be criticized with Wittgenstein’s argument?

This article introduces an internal view of language based on Augustine’s divine illumination and critiques it through the lens of Wittgenstein’s Polemic, discussing how it can secure the certainty of knowledge and language in interaction with the external world.

 

I will criticize Augustine’s internal and directive view of language through the lens of Wittgenstein’s Polemic. To do so, I will first explain Augustine’s view of directive language and his theory of divine illumination, which is based on the binary opposition of ‘inside and outside’ and attempts to secure the certainty of knowledge through the human interior, and then interpret and criticize it in my own way, utilizing arguments from Wittgenstein’s later philosophical investigations. Finally, I will discuss the way in which language functions.

The following is a statement from Augustine’s Confessions.
“When I saw them (my brother and sister) naming an object, calling it a moor, and running towards it, I understood that the object was called by the sound they made as they directed it. (Italics mine.) Thus, by repeatedly hearing the words used in the proper places in various other sentences, I gradually came to know what object they were directing, and after practicing to pronounce these words with my mouth, I came to use them to express what I desired.” (Confessions I. 8. 13)

This passage from the Confessions, “I realized that the object is called by the sound that is made while directing it,” shows that Augustine’s view of language is essentially a “directive view of language. An indicative view of language is one in which the meaning of a word is understood as the object to which it refers. According to this view, the meaning of the words “eat” and “walk” can be grasped by the act of eating or the object of walking, respectively. However, this raises some questions. For example, how should the noun phrases “walk normally” and “walk in a hurry” be defined? According to the directive view of language, they can be defined by pointing to the object being walked and saying “that is walking normally” or “that is walking in a hurry”. However, this definition is ambiguous. To solve this problem, do we need to specify a precise speed for each act of “walking normally” or “walking in a hurry”, and does the speed generate meaning? But this logic leads to the conclusion that even if a child is walking in a hurry, he is not walking in a hurry if he does not meet the speed standard.
From this, we can see that defining an object by referring to it oversimplifies the function of language. Simply referring to external objects does not explain the wide range of uses of language. So, what does Augustine, with his directive view of language, have to say about this problem?
Augustine believes that the source of this problem is that language is viewed exclusively in terms of its external use. In his view, the true definition or meaning of language cannot be established by referring to external objects, i.e., visible, external objects. This is because we cannot define “walk normally” and “walk in haste” by referring to external objects. Augustine recognizes this. The world outside of us is uncertain. Knowledge gained from an uncertain external world, knowledge gained by pointing to external objects, cannot be true knowledge, for knowledge must be certain and immutable. Where, then, is true knowledge?
Augustine explains it by contrasting the outside and the inside of man. If the external world is uncertain and therefore cannot provide knowledge, the internal world is certain and therefore can provide true knowledge. In the “walking” argument mentioned earlier, the outside world seems to be uncertain. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the interior is certain. On what grounds does Augustine make this claim? He relies on the theory of divine illumination. Divine illumination is the explanation that knowledge of necessary and immutable objects is acquired through the activity of an intellectual light that illuminates them internally. This intellectual light is grounded in God, i.e., God is the ultimate ground that makes human intellectual activity possible. Since God is a necessary being, the light shone by God enables human beings to engage in intellectual activity concerning necessary knowledge. Therefore, knowledge within human beings, unlike knowledge outside of them, can provide certainty and immutability.
In conclusion, the distinction between “walking normally” and “walking in haste” is given meaning through the activity of light emanating from God from within rather than from without. For example, by internally dictating the images that arise from within, i.e., the images of ‘walking normally’ and ‘walking in haste’, the semantic basis for the distinction between the two is formed. This image is made possible by divine illumination.
We can see from the discussion so far that Augustine’s binary opposition between external and internal is tied to an internal view of language. Furthermore, this internal view of language reveals that it is based on a directive view of language in which the words of language are still the objects of their referents (internal mental referents, according to Augustine). Furthermore, we can see that the activity of the intellect through language eventually becomes the activity of an internal spirit, or in other words, the activity of light that comes from God. This activity of light makes it possible to direct images or representations in the human mind, as Augustine’s answer to the “walking” controversy demonstrates, and this makes it possible to generate meaning. In other words, the meaning of language is made possible by directing internal representations.
However, I would like to criticize Augustine’s assertion of the certainty of internal human knowledge through Wittgenstein’s argument. For example, suppose a man is standing on a train platform. He cannot remember when the train is coming, so he recalls the train schedule he saw at the ticket booth. He mentally recalls the schedule he saw at the ticket booth and thinks that the train will arrive at 7:30. Here, according to Augustine, the representation of withdrawal would be knowledge gained through internal representation. But where does the certainty of the knowledge of 7:30 from the train schedule come from? The certainty of knowledge is an age-old debate. In this discussion, I’m not interested in how certainty of knowledge is possible, but rather by what route it comes about. To achieve certainty of knowledge about the train schedule, Cheol-su repeatedly recalls the schedule. But when 7:30 comes and the train hasn’t arrived, he goes back to the ticket office to check the schedule. As it turns out, the train he’s waiting for actually arrives at 7:50. The important point here is that the knowledge is modified by checking the external train schedule, not by repeating the memory.
This example shows that certainty of knowledge cannot be guaranteed only by internal human sources. I argue that the certainty of knowledge can be secured through the interaction of the internal and external, not just the external. While Augustine believed that meaning is formed and language is materialized through light from God within the human being, I believe that interaction with the outside world is necessary to ensure the certainty of knowledge.
Therefore, human knowledge needs to interact with the outside world to ensure its certainty. Meaning is also formed through interaction with the outside world, and language is materialized in this interaction. In other words, human knowledge and language are constantly being reconstructed and established through interaction with the outside world. Augustine’s internal view of language can be criticized in this respect.