Diversity and freedom in scientific methodology: How can scientific knowledge be understood in the light of Feynman and Lakatos?

FireAvent and Lakatos offer opposing perspectives on the choice of methodology and theory in science. FireAvent argued for scientific freedom and diversity, while Lakatos emphasized the rationality of science through research programs. Their theories lead to important discussions about the development of science and its role in society.

 

At a time when the methodology of science, the comparison and change of theories in science, and the superiority of scientific knowledge were being debated by Popper, Kuhn, and others, with various explanations of the methodology and its limitations, FireAvent presented an anarchistic and challenging epistemology. FireAvent’s opposition to the methodology represented by the phrase “Anything Goes” and its advocacy for greater freedom for scientists. Lakatos, on the other hand, argued for a research program theory to assert the rationality of science and to present a methodology that is in line with history, and unlike the existing methodology, he made a new attempt to impose no rules on the process/method of science. FireAvent positively evaluated this attempt from his point of view, and they had a lively exchange to the extent that they planned to co-author a book. With this in mind, we’ll take a look at the theories of FireAvent and Lakatos, which are as different as they are similar.
FireAvent’s core argument can be summarized by his phrase “Anything Goes”. He first argues that not all methodologies that have been proposed so far have been successful. The history and process of science is not so simple that it can be explained by a set of methodological rules, and attempts to impose methodological rules ignore the diverse conditions that affect science and make science inflexible, which is not only unrealistic, but also unhelpful to science. Furthermore, the world that humanity seeks to explore is largely unknown, and it is not advisable to start with constraints imposed by methodology. FireAvent doesn’t just oppose methodology. He believes that science needs to adopt a “humanitarian attitude. His opposition to methodology is also about increasing individual freedom by removing all methodological coercion from science. In FireAvent’s view, the way our society currently institutionalizes science is incompatible with a humanitarian attitude. Currently, society teaches its members to take science for granted and makes it mandatory to have the same science education. No member of society has the right to demand to learn other knowledge instead of science. This forced and rigid way of teaching institutionalized science prevents individual characteristics, such as intuition and mindset, from intervening in scientific research, which hinders not only individual freedom but also the progress of science. FireAvent also likens the absolute authority of science in modern society to the position of religion in the past, and argues that society should be liberated from science just as society was liberated from religion in the past. This would create a society that is ideologically neutral, where science is not considered superior to other forms of knowledge.
FireAvent’s “Anything Goes” is a good place to start for his perspective on the problem of theory selection, where he first argues for non-commitment. By incommensurability, he means that different theories use different definitions/concepts and criteria, which makes logical comparisons between two theories impossible. This implies that the problem of theory selection in science involves subjectivity. In the end, FireAvent argues that the problem of theory selection is not subjective, but entirely dependent on the subjectivity of each individual, so that no matter which theory is chosen, the scientist’s choice cannot be criticized as “irrational”. At the same time, each theory tries to convince scientists through various propaganda activities.
While FireAvent’s argument is consistent with the anarchist thesis, Lakatos’s theory differs from FireAvent’s in that it does not propose a methodology, nor does it seek rationality in science, nor does it provide an explanation for the process of science or the selection and comparison of theories. Lakatos’ research program includes both positive and negative discovery. The negative discovery method is based on the core premise underlying the program, namely that the “solid core” of the program cannot be rejected or modified. If a solid core is rejected or modified, the scientist has already chosen to leave the research program. The positive discovery method consists of several guidelines for reproducing the research program. For a research program to be a scientific research program, it must be consistent enough to derive a clear program for future exploration, and it must at least occasionally succeed in predicting new facts. If a research program continues to succeed in predicting new facts, the theory becomes a progressive research program; if it fails to predict new facts, it becomes a regressive research program. This is also used to determine their relative value when comparing different research programs. A regressive research program will give way to a progressive research program. However, Lakatos’s explanation doesn’t tell us which theory a scientist should choose when faced with two competing theories in the immediate future, because regressive programs can be transformed back into progressive programs through research, and sometimes it takes a long time to predict new facts.
FireAvent’s theory is bold and challenging, and has been widely criticized. A.F. Charmers accepts the essentials of his theory but criticizes its application to reality. While he responds positively to FireAvent’s methodological objections, saying that his arguments are successful, he criticizes FireAvent’s core theory of personal freedom, saying that while FireAvent uses Mill’s concept of freedom as freedom from all restraint, he overlooks the positive aspects of restraint. Individuals are born into a society that already exists, so they are not already free to choose, and their freedom is determined by their place in the social structure. In order to improve science or society, we have to start from the objective situation we are in, and rely on the means at hand, which makes the ideals of FireAvent unhelpful in practice. Charmus concludes his overall assessment of FireAvent’s position by quoting John Krieger’s interpretation that if it were adopted, it would likely lead to the continuation of power in the hands of those in power.
Certainly, the essentials of FireAvent’s theory are not easy to reject. While Charmus criticizes that under FireAbend’s theory, science would be driven in a direction that preserves those in power, this danger is more likely to be seen in other theories with methodologies. If Copernicus or Einstein hadn’t broken with the established direction of research to argue for heliocentrism and relativity, respectively, and if they hadn’t continued their work despite the errors and unresolved problems with their theories when they first came out, might we have seen a longer period of time in which heliocentrism and Newtonian mechanics remained in power? In this sense, Fireaventure’s call for scientists to be free to explore is appealing. However, there is an extreme side to his argument. FireAvent’s “Anything Goes” doesn’t just apply to methodology, but also seems to apply to the way he views non-scientific disciplines: he argues that there is no rational way to say that science is superior to any other discipline, and that people should be able to learn astrology, for example, instead of science if they want to. In other words, he allows for all “pseudoscience”. However, not all non-scientific disciplines are called pseudoscience. “Pseudoscience” literally means “pretending to be science,” and it remains pseudoscience mainly because it lacks what it needs to be science. Does this mean that pseudoscience should be evaluated equally with science? Of course, as FireAvent says, we might think so because of the lack of research and knowledge about the pseudoscience. However, it seems likely that there are factors in these pseudosciences that may or may not justify their lack of acceptance in academia and society that explain their distinction from science. In addition, it has been argued that the choice of theory depends on the personal preferences of the scientist and the propaganda of each theory, because the two theories cannot be compared, so it is impossible to say which theory is superior, but even if the theories cannot be compared, their performance can be compared. While this data cannot predict the future, and therefore cannot be used to justify the choice of a theory, it can explain why more people favor one theory over another, or why it would be more natural to favor one theory over another.
As for Lakatos, Charmus points out that Lakatos fails to provide clear criteria for rejecting a research program or choosing between competing research programs. Since we can only know whether a research program is progressive or regressive after the passage of time, he cannot offer any advice to scientists facing immediate decisions. Lakatos sought to provide rules that would prevent intellectual corruption in the pursuit of rationality in science, but as Lakatos himself acknowledged, his theory cannot advise individual scientists. However, this is one of the reasons why FireAvent positively evaluates Lakatos’ theory as opposed to empiricism, disprovism, paradigm theory, etc. FireAvent considers Lakatos’s theory to be anarchism disguised as anarchism, citing the fact that Lakatos’s theory does not impose rules on scientists, but only provides criteria to help scientists make an assessment of the situation they are in, and that unlike other theories, Lakatos’s theory does not have a problem with choosing a regressive program, even if it is regressive, but also mentions the possibility that a regressive program can become progressive again. However, he strongly criticizes the fact that Lakatos uses the superiority of science, especially physics, over other disciplines as a premise, as if it were a proven fact.
In this way, Lakatos’s theories and FireAvent’s theories seem to be different, but from FireAvent’s perspective, they are actually similar. He even compares Lakatos’s theory to a Trojan horse for anarchism, so I would like to incorporate Lakatos’s theory into FireAvent’s theory and shackle it with Lakatos’s theory so that FireAvent’s theory does not seem too idealistic and extreme. First, we will keep FireAvent’s theory as a whole, but adopt Lakatos’s research program. This should quell the complaint that FireAvent does not provide any explanation for the process of science. However, like Lakatos, we are not introducing a research program to pursue “rational change”. Here, the research program merely explains phenomena and provides another resource for scientists to use when choosing among competing theories. The performance of the research program may explain why scientists prefer one over the other. We also use the research program to question the implications of FireAvent’s claim that there is no rational basis for claiming that science is superior to other disciplines and should therefore be treated equally with all other bodies of knowledge. According to FireAvent, each discipline must have a well-defined purpose and a way to achieve that purpose, and according to Lakatos, to be a “scientific” research program, a program must be consistent enough to produce results, and at least occasionally produce new facts. Based on this, it is not possible to say that science is superior to other disciplines, and therefore it is not inherently natural to give scientific knowledge authority over knowledge from any other discipline. Before making a hasty judgment that another discipline is inferior to science, it is necessary to study the discipline to find out its purpose, the means by which it is to be achieved, and the facts that are being derived from its research program. A field that would be classified as “pseudoscience” would lack at least one of the following: a well-defined purpose, a way to achieve it, coherence, and the discovery of new facts. If a research program lacks any of these, i.e., if it is extremely regressive, it is not irrational to choose it. This is because a regressive program is likely to yield new facts at the end of the study. However, if a program is extremely regressive, fewer people will choose it, and it will be less likely to be funded, published, etc. The fact that it is regressive is a major blow to the effort to promote it, and it will be more likely to be overtaken by other programs. This can explain why societies and other individuals may not be interested in, or shy away from, the field: even if it is not unreasonable for an individual to want to study astrology, it can explain why societies do not attach much value or authority to it. In other words, “pseudoscience” is usually defined by social and historical reasons rather than by objective criteria.
In the end, the core of FireAvent’s argument is that science should be given more freedom, and society should be given more freedom from science, so that members can learn from each other about their own disciplines, or systematically learn about other disciplines to familiarize themselves with their goals, methods, etc. before evaluating or using them. The scientist can then use this experience, knowledge of other disciplines, and personal subjectivity to find a contextualized way of doing science. However, unlike FireAvent, which accepts pseudoscience, we have introduced Lakatos’ research program to provide data/criteria to help exclude pseudoscience and select theories. This does not completely eliminate pseudoscience. It is difficult to judge whether a scientist’s choices in research are rational or irrational. However, it does seem to help select programs that are more likely to provide beneficial results. In modern society, “fusion” and “integration” between disciplines are often attempted, and since science is also subjective, a free and open epistemology/approach that is not bound by methodology may facilitate communication/convergence between science and other disciplines by reducing the sense of mystery and reverence for science.