Can Popper’s disprovism be a true alternative to overcome the limitations of inductivism?

Inductivism, which emerged after the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century, is a method of reasoning that draws general conclusions based on observations, but Popper pointed out its limitations and proposed disprovism as an alternative. However, we will discuss that disprovism suffers from similar problems to inductivism in that it relies on observation, and therefore cannot be an alternative to inductivism.

 

Since the Scientific Revolution in the 17th century, scientists have come to rely on empirical facts, such as the results of experiments and observations, as the source of knowledge. This led to the rise of inductivism, a method of reasoning that draws general conclusions that can explain specific facts or events. However, Karl Raimund Popper, in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pointed out the limitations of inductivism in that no observation can precede a hypothesis or theory, and proposed disprovism as an alternative. Popper argues that hypotheses and theories are put forward through a process of speculation and debate, and are accepted as provisional facts through attempts at disproving them. In this article, we’ll show that Popper’s disprovationalism cannot be an alternative to inductivism because it suffers from similar problems to inductivism.
Popper points to the theory-dependence of observation as one of the problems with inductivism. According to Popper, theories of any kind precede all observations. He argues that observational statements cannot serve as a firm foundation for supporting scientific theories and laws because they are fallible, just as the theories themselves are fallible. Therefore, he argues that induction, which involves drawing general conclusions based on observations, must be wrong.
The alternative proposed is called disprovism. Disprovism is the view that science progresses because hypotheses or theories are continually attempted to be disproved by observation or experimentation, and the disproved hypotheses or theories are replaced by better ones. Disproversialists argue that scientific hypotheses or theories should be disprovable, and that these hypotheses or theories get better and better as they withstand disproving attempts. As they withstand more attempts at disproving them, the hypothesis or theory is accepted as provisionally true, but can never be established as true.
However, despite being presented as an alternative to inductivism, disprovism suffers from the same problems with inductivism that Popper identified. First, complete disprovals are not possible in disprovationalism because there are no theories that can be truly confirmed, so theories themselves are incomplete as a basis for disproving them. Therefore, other observations must be used as a basis, and because of the theory-dependent nature of observations described earlier, observations cannot be a firm foundation for supporting theories and laws. As a result, the problems Popper identified with inductivism are the same with disprovationalism, leading to the conclusion that no hypothesis or theory can be completely disproved.
Second, the way a hypothesis or theory develops in Popper’s view is not much different from the way a hypothesis or theory develops in inductivism: Popper argues that the process of theorizing in science is driven by conjectures, and these conjectures are challenged by observation and experimentation. If these guesses are proven wrong by observation, the conclusions are discarded. Popper’s theory of conjecture and refutation is that through trial and error, falsehoods are eliminated and truths are arrived at. A conjecture here is not just a collection of experimental results, but a bold conjecture that can be refuted. Using the example of crows, if you see 10 black crows on the road and come up with the hypothesis “crows are black”, that’s induction. If you have the same experience and come up with the conjectural law “crows will be black”, that’s conjecture. I don’t think there’s really much difference between the two methods. The nature of conjecture is similar to induction in that it can be debunked and discarded if it turns out to be wrong. If we find a black crow, the former hypothesis is refuted, and the latter is discarded as false. Also, at its core, conjecture is based on observation, just like induction. Since conjecture and induction are similar, and even if they are different, conjecture is based on observation, the theory-dependent nature of observation makes it difficult to see how the process of conjecture and refutation is better than induction.
For this reason, I disagree with the claim that Popper proposed disprovism to overcome the limitations of inductivism. As mentioned earlier, induction, argumentation, and disproving are all based on observation, and therefore cannot escape the limitations of observation. Rather, I think it makes more sense to view disprovism as a form of inductivism. Given that the definition of induction is a method of reasoning that draws general conclusions to explain specific facts or events, it would be a further development of inductivism to consider disprovism as critical inductivism and include it in inductivism. Assuming that complete disprovability is possible, critical inductivism is more valid than traditional inductivism because it allows us to discard false theories through disprovability, and evaluate existing hypotheses or theories using disprovability as a measure. Of course, even if we include disprovability in inductivism, the problem of theory dependence of observations still remains, so the limitations of inductivism remain. Therefore, the process of presenting and evaluating theories through induction and disprovability is still incomplete and inconclusive. In order to advance science, we believe that new arguments must be presented that can address these fundamental problems and the theory-dependent nature of observations.