Why does Richard Dawkins’ theory of the selfish gene fail to explain all of the complex behaviors of animals?

In The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins argues that genes determine animal behavior, but his theory doesn’t fully explain complex behaviors, such as learned behavior in monkeys or parental favoritism. In addition, the unproven existence of genes responsible for specific behaviors and several logical holes undermine his theory’s persuasiveness.

 

In his book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins offers a creative and innovative interpretation of genes and evolutionary theory. His argument is that natural selection favors “selfish” genes that are adapted to the environment and favor reproduction over others. He lays out a number of arguments to reach this conclusion, but they all follow the same basic pattern. In other words, he believes that the behavior of every animal on the planet is influenced and determined by its genes. (Dawkins introduces the concept of “memes” in the middle of the book, but this concept only applies to humans, so it presumably only explains human behavior.) While some of Dawkins’s arguments are compelling, others lack logic or are not easily convincing. Let’s take a look at some of the more challenging aspects of his argument and why.
First, Dawkins’ concept of “behavioral genes” leaves something to be desired. Rosenbuller, a biologist, observed certain behaviors in worker bees and argued that different genes are responsible for lifting the lid that covers the larvae and abandoning the larvae. Dawkins used this to explain that there is a gene responsible for a specific behavior, and that gene determines the animal’s behavior. However, this theory is limited by the fact that there are complex behaviors that cannot be explained by the fact that a gene is expressed. For example, humans exhibit higher-order behaviors such as eating with cutlery and wearing makeup, which cannot be explained by genes alone. In recognition of this, Dawkins defined “memes” to explain human cultural behavior, meaning that human behavior can be explained as a combination of genes and memes, which means that the genes responsible for the behavior cannot serve as an adequate counterexample for humans. However, according to Dawkins’ theory, memes are only relevant to humans, so the behavior of other animals should be explained by genes alone.
However, many examples show that animal behavior cannot be explained by genes alone. A classic example is the banana peeling behavior of monkeys. Monkeys are known to peel bananas in much the same way as humans. Could this be the result of genetics? In one experiment, newborn monkeys were separated from their parents, cared for for three months, and then given a banana, which they were unable to peel properly. This suggests that the way a monkey peels a banana is not genetically determined. We could assume that the monkeys learned how to peel bananas through acquired learning, but this doesn’t fit Dawkins’ theory. If Dawkins’ theory is correct, then we must conclude that humans have the genes to perform higher-order behaviors through acquired learning, which would eliminate the need to introduce the concept of memes. The fact that Dawkins introduces memes suggests that he only wants to associate behavioral genes with behaviors that humans can do on their own without acquired training, which leads to the conclusion that Dawkins’ theory alone cannot explain the banana peeling behavior of monkeys.
Furthermore, Dawkins uses only one example of a worker bee to prove his claim that a behavioral gene exists, which is also logically flawed. He should have provided at least two or three additional examples to support his argument, which would have made it easier for readers to understand his point. Furthermore, while advances in cloning technology have taught us a lot about genes, the existence of genes responsible for specific behaviors has yet to be proven. This weakens Dawkins’ argument and needs further explanation to make his theory more convincing.
Dawkins’ interpretation of parental favoritism in animal behavior is also unconvincing. When there are more than two children, parents will favor their offspring in almost all cases. Dawkins introduces the concept of proximate age to argue that a mother’s genetic proximate age is the same for all her offspring, so there is no genetic basis for favoritism. However, he interprets favoritism as occurring based on the life expectancy and self-reliance of the offspring as they age. For example, when predators threaten, the older offspring are more protective, and when food is scarce, the youngest, who are less ready for independence, are favored. However, this interpretation fails to account for cases in which three or more offspring are favored, one of which is neither the oldest nor the youngest.
In the case of North American black ducks, there is a tendency to favor the younger, more colorful plumage, regardless of age. This could be a counterexample to Dawkins’ argument, showing that parental favoritism doesn’t necessarily depend on life expectancy or ability to be self-sustaining. In addition, animals such as peacocks discriminate between offspring based on appearance or reproductive potential, suggesting that Dawkins’ theory does not apply to all animals. Therefore, we need to acknowledge that the reasons for favoritism may be more diverse, and we need to supplement our narrative.
Finally, Dawkins’ interpretation of the high jumping behavior of the Thomson’s gazelle needs further explanation. Citing Zahavi, Dawkins explains that when gazelles encounter a predator, jumping high is a signal to show off their fitness to scare the predator away from other individuals. While this seems reasonable on the surface, it lacks an explanation for why this behavior would still be an effective strategy if all gazelles did the same thing. The strategy can only be effective if we assume that predators do not remember the health status of individual gazelles, and this point needs further explanation.
In conclusion, Dawkins has presented an original theory that explains animal behavior based on genes, but his theory is still open to refutation. The genes responsible for behavior, parental favoritism, and the Thomson’s gazelle’s high jumping behavior are each flawed from various perspectives. Dawkins’s theory still has a lot of room for improvement, and it would be more convincing if he supplemented his arguments and approached them from different perspectives.