Can philosophical skepticism avoid contradicting itself while denying ultimate truth, and how does it affect philosophical inquiry?

Philosophy has always been a discipline that seeks certainty, but skepticism has challenged it to its very foundations. The skepticism of Gorgias and Albert, in particular, doubted the justifiability of philosophical knowledge and sought to render philosophy’s self-evident propositions meaningless. However, this skepticism avoids contradicting itself and plays a productive role in philosophical inquiry by strengthening the logic of justification.

 

Philosophy has always claimed to be the first discipline with the highest status of all disciplines. Underlying this confidence is the conviction that philosophical knowledge has the highest degree of certainty. For thousands of years, philosophers have explored the origins of human existence, the nature of the world, and moral values, and in doing so, philosophical inquiry has addressed some of the most fundamental questions that precede all other disciplines. Philosophy is thus not just a branch of knowledge, but a meta-discipline that underlies all knowledge. However, philosophy’s conceit is often challenged, even within philosophy itself, and skepticism is at the center of that challenge.
Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has repeatedly emerged and put philosophical certainty to the test. What is the role of skepticism, a lifeblood of doubt, in a philosophy whose vocation is the recognition of ultimate truth? These questions force us to re-examine the nature of philosophy and call for a redefinition of the direction of philosophical inquiry.
The three propositions of Gorgias, which appeared early in the history of philosophy, are the classic epitome of skepticism. According to him, first, nothing exists; second, even if something does exist, we cannot know it; and third, even if we do know something, we cannot communicate that knowledge to others. These three propositions are challenges that shake the very foundations of philosophical inquiry, fundamentally denying the possibility of knowledge. For someone with an anti-intellectualist bent, this extreme view can seem quite appealing. It denies the very value of all academic inquiry and the pursuit of truth, and it can be a tempting position for those who wish to undermine philosophical seriousness.
But there is a fatal contradiction. That is, Gorgias cannot deny, first, that he, the subject of extreme skepticism, exists; second, that he knows that he cannot know anything; and third, that he is communicating his knowledge of the impossibility of knowing anything to others. He is caught in a self-fulfilling prophecy in which, as soon as he denies what he absolutely wants to deny, he actually denies his own argument. This contradiction suggests that skepticism cannot be used as a basis for philosophical justification and reveals its limitations.
In modern times, extreme skepticism is epitomized by Albert’s “falsificationism,” which seeks to render meaningless the system of philosophical knowledge that derives other propositions from the first self-evident proposition, especially by denying the possibility of “final justification,” which is the lifeblood of all philosophical propositions. The traditional goal of philosophy, the certain recognition of ultimate truth, is radically challenged by Albert. His weapon of choice is the Münchhausen-Trilemma. The trilemma is a reference to the fable of Baron Münchhausen, who fell into a quagmire while riding his horse and tried to pull himself out by pulling his hair up. The fable highlights the problem that the logic of philosophical justification cannot support itself in the end.
According to Albert, any attempt to establish a first, definite proposition from which all subsequent propositions can be justified ultimately fails because it necessarily commits one of three errors

1. infinite recursion: you set up another higher-order proposition as the basis for justifying one claim, but this second proposition begs for a third, which begs for a fourth, and so on, and so on, and so on, so that final justification is impossible in principle.
2. Circular argumentation: Invoking a second proposition to justify a claim, but then using the first proposition to justify the second proposition, so this is also not a final justification.
3. procedural breakdown: stopping all discussion at a certain stage of the justification process because it is impossible to satisfy the ongoing need for justification, and establishing a proposition as a dogma that can never be challenged. This cannot be seen as final justification because it cuts off the continuation of rational argumentation.

The power of this trilemma is so great that no philosophical justification seems capable of withstanding it. This has led to a growing view in modern philosophy that knowledge is uncertain and that empirical methodologies, such as scientific inquiry, should play an important role in philosophical inquiry. However, Albert’s absolutization of the uncertainty of all propositions proves to be a fatal error: by stating that his claims are ‘certain’ on the basis of the ‘absolute justification’ of the triad, he falls into a ‘performative contradiction’, a discord between his ‘explicit assertions’ and his ‘implicit acts’.
The discovery of the performative contradiction shows that final justification is possible without falling into the Münchhausen trilemma, and the proof method used here is called a syllogistic proof. This method of proof circumvents the validity of a proposition P by showing that the moment a contradictory proposition of P, ~P, is stated, ~P is forced to deny itself. This is a very important method in philosophical argumentation, and can be used as a powerful tool to defend the possibility of knowledge against philosophical skepticism: Albert’s explicit assertion that “there are no certain perceptions” implies the assertion that “the perception that there are no certain perceptions is certain,” and thus already presupposes the proposition that “there are certain perceptions” that he is trying to negate. This way of proving gives us the possibility of establishing certain propositions in the face of falsificationist skepticism.
Skepticism, when taken to its extreme, is self-defeating, so it cannot be the ultimate philosophical end in itself. However, skepticism can play a productive role in a philosophy that is prone to dogmatism. In the process of philosophical inquiry, skepticism plays an important role in refining philosophical arguments and strengthening their justification, because the powerful challenge of skepticism contributes to the health of philosophy by forcing it to develop a justification logic that is immune enough to face it. It is through this challenge that philosophy constantly renews itself and gains the strength to continue its quest for truth.