To what extent is the press’s watchdog function protected in monitoring abuses of power and corruption?

This article explains that the media’s watchdog function in democratic societies plays an important role in monitoring abuses of power and social corruption, and analyzes the protections and legal limits of that function, focusing on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and defamation law.

 

The media’s ability to monitor and criticize abuses of political power and social corruption plays an important role in democratic societies and has been recognized as a necessary condition for the formation of healthy public opinion and the fulfillment of the public’s right to know. The press is often referred to as the “fourth branch” of society, and is considered an important check on society after the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This role goes beyond simply providing information to the public, but also plays an important role in preventing the concentration and abuse of power and promoting transparency and accountability.
In the United States, the media’s watchdog and criticism function is likened to a watchdog, which is recognized as constitutionally guaranteed. This watchdog function emphasizes the role of media organizations, which goes beyond mere individual freedom of expression; it is an institutional right granted to media organizations rather than a fundamental right of individuals. This role of the media is to raise awareness of various social issues and help people understand and evaluate power properly.
If the watchdog function is a constitutionally guaranteed right, what is the basis for it? The traditional view in the United States is based on a liberal interpretation of the meaning of the First Amendment, enacted in 1791, at the level of media organizations. This provision, which guarantees freedom of the press, states that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. In this context, the press plays an important role in making the government’s activities transparent and helping the public to be well-informed about their government. This is considered essential to prevent the abuse of power in a democratic society and to realize social justice.
According to this view, the ideology of a critical press already existed around the time of independence, as articles criticizing the government were freely published in newspapers. Based on this, the First Amendment was perceived as a natural extension of the First Amendment to media organizations. This view sees the core function of journalistic institutions in their “watchdog value,” and argues that even if the press is harmed by commercialism, the watchdog function should be protected because it is less harmful than the abuse of state power. This view leads to the logic that even if the press is at risk of being distorted by commercial interests, on the whole, its function should be protected as a necessary element for the healthy development of a democratic society.
To this end, they argue that regulation of the press should be kept to a minimum, and even that defamation cannot be established if it is in the public interest. They also suggest that policy considerations, such as enhanced access to state institutions, are required for a more active watchdog function.
However, this view is criticized as an overly broad interpretation of the constitutional provision and lacks concrete evidence to support it. No matter how important the role of the press is, the argument that its function should be absolutely protected is open to debate. Indeed, some argue that if freedom of speech is guaranteed without restrictions, it may actually infringe on other social values and individual rights.
Gleason, an American media law scholar, offers a different perspective by analyzing defamation cases from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He argues that the courts’ recognition of the press’s watchdog function as a constitutional right of media organizations is directly related to the courts’ recognition of the unique nature of the press’s investigative reporting process. By the end of the 19th century, the press had become highly sensationalistic in its reporting and there were calls for social regulation. The number of libel lawsuits also skyrocketed, and the press was at a severe disadvantage due to the application of libel laws that required truthful reporting.
The number of newspapers was increasing and the newspaper industry was growing significantly, and newspaper publishers saw defamation lawsuits as the biggest threat to their business. They aggressively fought libel suits and made various efforts to legislate the watchdog function as an immune privilege. In doing so, they began to emphasize the role of the press as a public institution with social responsibilities, rather than as a mere conveyor of information. These efforts expanded the courts’ recognition of the press’s public function, but did not affect the outcome of litigation. For example, in an 1896 libel suit arising from an article critical of a city official, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the press’s watchdog role but ruled that the article in question fell outside the scope of the freedom of the press. The Supreme Court recognized that newspapers’ watchdog role can reveal the truth and promote civility. In other words, the court had a positive attitude toward the watchdog function of the press, but it still did not accept the media’s argument that the complexity of the reporting process could be overcome by emphasizing truth-telling. This trend in court rulings continued through the mid-20th century. Ultimately, according to Gleason, the rationale for constitutional protection of the watchdog function can be found in the history of the development of defamation law.