How has Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science influenced the development of science?

Thomas Kuhn argued that scientific progress consists of paradigm shifts rather than the accumulation of knowledge. His theories emphasize revolutionary changes in science, as opposed to traditional views of science, and have had a significant impact on the direction and efficiency of scientific research.

 

Thomas Kuhn and his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions are indispensable when discussing the philosophy of science since the 20th century. By introducing the concept of paradigm, Kuhn explained that all scientific behavior, including scientific understanding, speculation, and research, takes place within a set cognitive framework, and that science advances not through the accumulation of knowledge but through paradigm shifts. His theory was at odds with the traditional view of science, which emphasized disproversialism and the accumulation of knowledge. Scholars of the time were critical of Kuhn’s theories, even organizing symposiums on them. Some felt that Kuhn’s theory took the development of science too far and entailed a devotion to paradigms that stifled the spirit of criticism. Indeed, his philosophy of science is somewhat conservative and lacking in rigor in that it accepts paradigms as orthodoxy and is based on trust rather than verification. However, accepting his theories and looking at science from this perspective can be very helpful in scientific research. In this article, I will focus on Kuhn’s philosophy of science and discuss the constructive impact of his theories on scientific research and how we should treat them.
Understanding Kuhn requires an understanding of paradigms. Unfortunately, Kuhn’s use of the term in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is quite confusing, and it is difficult to fully grasp its meaning as a single entity. Taken together with his other books and interpretations of them, it seems that the general meaning of paradigm that he intended is closer to the original meaning of the term: a “legend” or “preface”. Just as an introduction to a book usually tells the reader what the book is about or how to write it, a paradigm, according to Kuhn, serves as a scientific “model” that presents a particular theory and method for explaining scientific phenomena. The geodynamic theory is a good example to understand this. Before the advent of geodynamics, all scholars believed in epicycles, and all astronomical phenomena were understood and explained in terms of epicycles, so it was the paradigm for understanding astronomy at that time.
When scientists accept the paradigm of the time as orthodoxy, they conduct all scientific activities, including research and problem solving, based on it, and Kuhn defined this behavior as normal science according to the paradigm. It is the observation and understanding of all scientific phenomena based on the paradigm, and the solution of problems posed by the paradigm. If the geodynamic theory is a paradigm, then understanding and explaining all phenomena based on the geodynamic theory is normal science. In this case, the problems posed by the paradigm are those that have not been addressed before, but whose outcome is predicted by the paradigm, or those that need to be addressed in order for the paradigm to be refined. Kuhn likened normal science to “putting together a puzzle” because scientists do all their scientific work within the framework of a paradigm.
However, since paradigms are not “facts” but rather the accepted framework of the time, we cannot be sure that all scientific phenomena in the universe fit into them. Kuhn suggested that existing paradigms may be threatened by the accumulation of counterexamples that cannot be explained by the paradigm. If this threat persists, a new paradigm (the “new paradigm”) will emerge to explain the counterexamples, putting the new paradigm in competition with the old paradigm (the “old paradigm”). In this case, the two paradigms are in a relationship of incommensurability. The two competing incommensurable paradigms are mutually verified by scientists, and only the winning paradigm remains. At this point, the old paradigm is discarded and the new paradigm replaces it, and normal science proceeds. Kuhn defined this phenomenon as a “Scientific Revolution” and argued that scientific progress is a discontinuous revolution of incommensurable paradigms.
Embracing Kuhn’s philosophy of science and viewing science from this perspective has advantages for scientific research. For one thing, normal science is fairly inclusive in its pursuit of truth. In general, when discussing truth, there is a divide between realist and anti-realist positions. Realists believe that truth should not only have the empirical validity to describe observable facts and predict new phenomena, but should also be able to fully explain the unobservable. Anti-realists, on the other hand, believe that discussing the unobservable is pointless. This isn’t just skepticism, it’s a realistic stance that cautions against setting unrealistic goals. Kuhn’s search for truth is based on anti-realism, but he doesn’t dismiss realism. Because the paradigm of normal science is a cognitive framework that was created to encompass all scientific concepts and theories that have been discussed, it is based on only those scientific phenomena that have been discussed, i.e., confirmed, and does not take into account those that have not been discussed, i.e., unconfirmed. In this sense, it can be said to be based on anti-realism. On the other hand, once a paradigm is accepted as normal science, it tries to explain all scientific phenomena based on it, i.e., it tries to explain the unobservable, so it can be said that it partly reflects the direction of truth-seeking that realism wants to pursue. This is a loose distinction between realist and anti-realist truths. This is because antirealism claims to be true based on theories about things that have been historically discussed and confirmed, i.e., it claims to be able to explain unobservable things despite the difficulty of verification. This definition of truth satisfies a higher level of accessibility for scientific research in that it does not reduce the domain of truth, but also satisfies the realism required for scientific research. Superstring theory is a good example to illustrate this.
Superstring theory is a theory that can explain all the interactions and elementary particles of interest in modern physics, as well as everything that the current paradigm of physics can explain. Furthermore, it can explain the unobservable realm of quanta. However, even those who study and believe in the theory admit that direct observation of superstrings, a fundamental element of the theory, is virtually impossible. This makes both the realist and antirealist positions, taken strictly, lacking in truth. However, from Kuhn’s point of view, it perfectly explains all the known facts and is therefore not disqualified as a paradigm of normal science. In other words, Kuhn’s position allows for realistic research without narrowing the field of truth. This makes scientific research more accessible. In other words, it can increase the efficiency of scientific research.
Normal science also provides a clear direction for the natural sciences. In general, studying the natural sciences means exploring the scientific theories and concepts that make up our world. However, the big question is whether these theories and concepts exist. The existence of what we want to study must be guaranteed in order to establish research goals, which is difficult to do. Normal science is based on paradigms, which provide scientists with objectives and goals for their research. Acceptance of a paradigm means acceptance of it as orthodoxy: all scientific phenomena must be explainable in terms of the paradigm, and all unconfirmed but expected consequences of the paradigm’s theories must exist. In other words, the possibility of explaining these problems and their existence are guaranteed by the paradigm, which makes it possible to start researching them.
The recent discovery of gravitational waves is an example of this. Based on relativity, gravitational waves are necessarily an observable phenomenon. However, the existence of gravitational waves was not confirmed until the death of Einstein, who proposed the theory of relativity. Physicists, including Kip Thorne, put together a list of phenomena that should be observed when gravitational waves occur based on relativity and built LIGO, an instrument to observe them. The LIGO team eventually announced the discovery of gravitational waves in 2016, which earned them the 2017 Nobel Prize in Physics. This might seem like a risky approach, especially when the authenticity of the background theory has not been proven. However, if we were to deny the validity of all scientific research based on the unprovenness of background theories, or paradigms, then humanity’s search for truth would remain stagnant until the underlying theories are proven. Furthermore, it is likely that the scientific approach itself would not be successful. From this perspective, normal science contributes to speeding up scientific research by providing a roadmap for it.
So far, we’ve discussed Kuhn’s philosophy of science and its implications for scientific research. Kuhn’s philosophy of science defined cognitive norms called paradigms and presented normal science within them. He described scientific progress as the replacement of paradigms rather than the accumulation of knowledge. Although his approach has been criticized by many scholars, it has broadened the spectrum of philosophy of science and has had a significant impact not only on the philosophy of science but also on the natural and social sciences. Acceptance of his philosophy of science has and will continue to contribute to the effectiveness of scientific research in terms of the pursuit of truth and the direction of research, as discussed earlier. However, the dangers of Kuhn’s philosophy of science, which has been criticized, should also be considered. Taking all of this into consideration, we can see that his philosophy of science should be viewed through an efficientist lens. Rather than simply condemning and rejecting his theories, we should accept their positive impact on scientific activity while remaining critical of the risks they pose. I believe that if we embrace his philosophy of science from this perspective, we will make a great contribution to advancing scientific research by enabling a rational approach to scientific research.