How do scientific theories form and remain objective, and what do Popper and Kuhn’s views tell us?

This lesson examines the process by which scientific theories are formulated, developed, and remain objective based on the arguments of Popper and Kuhn. Popper discusses the objectivity of scientific knowledge through the concept of disproversialism and Kuhn through the concept of paradigms. I conclude that scientific objectivity is justified within paradigms.

 

“Geodynamics” and “relativity” are scientific theories that we often encounter in science class. But how are these scientific theories established and developed, and how can they be considered true? And can different scientific theories and knowledge be said to have absolute objectivity? To answer these questions, let’s take a look at Popper and Kuhn’s arguments about the objectivity of science and scientific knowledge. In their arguments, we’ll see how theories are developed and whether objectivity is guaranteed in the process.
What is science? Popper advocated critical rationalism and antinomianism. Critical rationalism is the idea that science can grow through criticism and that theories should be tested as rigorously as possible. Disprovationalism holds that the logic of science is disproving, not proving, and that scientific progress is an endless cycle of speculation and disproof. In response to Popper’s claims about science, Kuhn argues that science begins with the abandonment of critical discussion. Kuhn also argues for the concept of a “paradigm,” a normative example, a tradition that is created by following a norm. According to Kuhn, science begins by abandoning critical discussion, and normal science is an effort to fit nature into the relatively rigid boxes that paradigms have already created.
How do scientific theories arise and develop, and how can their objectivity be justified? In response to these questions, Popper criticized logical empiricism and proposed the possibility of disprovability. Popper criticized logical empiricism and proposed the possibility of disprovability: no universal statement can be derived through induction, and no theory can be supported by observation, i.e., no matter how many observations there are, they cannot probabilistically support a theory. He also proposed the possibility of disprovability: individual case statements (observations) cannot support universal statements, but they can negate universal statements. Therefore, he argued that the empirical inquiry of science is to eliminate hypotheses, and hypotheses that are not eliminated can be considered as confirmed. In other words, when we eliminate hypotheses by disproving them with the possibility of disproving them, we can be objective about the hypotheses that are not eliminated. Kuhn, on the other hand, argued that scientific activity is neither confirming nor disproving theories, and proposed the paradigm of normal science. An analysis of the development of scientific knowledge must describe what science has actually done, and it must follow a “paradigm” that is the standard and example that determines the method, direction, and legitimacy of research through the history of science. In other words, scientific research is to fit theories to nature within a paradigm through the history of science.
This is how Popper and Kuhn’s arguments about science, the algorithm of scientific development, and the justification of the objectivity of scientific knowledge have been presented. While learning about Popper and Kuhn’s arguments, I thought about the definition and meaning of science and how the objectivity of scientific theories can be justified. In my view, science is the process of understanding actual objective facts about nature through theories, and the process of doing science is the process of understanding objective facts about nature through a paradigm, such as Kuhn’s paradigm. The paradigm in this context will be the way science is studied, the direction of research, the scale of observation (unit of measurement), etc. I believe that the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be justified within a paradigm. I will provide the following arguments for this claim.
First, if the paradigm changes, the criteria by which the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be judged will change, i.e., the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be justified within a paradigm by the criteria for objectivity of that paradigm. Examples include Einstein’s declaration that there is no need to explain how light spreads through the ether, or the fight between Newton and the Cartesians over teleology. As you can see from these examples, different paradigms, scales, and research methods can lead to different theories for understanding natural phenomena. However, if a group of scientists adopts a paradigm and observes nature within that paradigm, there will be the best hypothesis among many hypotheses, and that hypothesis can be considered objective as scientific knowledge.
Second, the way we observe and look at nature is different depending on the concepts that have been established within the paradigm. The same phenomenon, object, or event can be defined and observed differently as paradigms change within a group of scientists over time. Ancient people described planets as “wandering stars,” and their definitions were vague. This vague definition of a planet was clarified in 2006 by the International Astronomical Union: it must be orbiting the sun, have enough gravity to form a sphere with its own gravity, and “exclude neighbors” smaller than itself. However, this is a vague definition that only applies within the solar system and is not a precise definition that can be expressed in all of nature. In this way, theories can be interpreted differently depending on the definition of phenomena and objects within a paradigm, and objectivity can vary depending on the paradigm. Therefore, the justification of the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be established within a paradigm.
Third, there is no way to prove the legitimacy of a scientific theory. There are objective facts about nature, but no one knows the objective facts about nature; we can only hypothesize and speculate about what we observe. That’s why a group of scientists can justify their objectivity within a paradigm with a few assumptions and measures of observation. But objectivity within this paradigm is not necessarily objectivity in all paradigms. An objective fact about absolute nature would be valid within any paradigm, but we would not be able to verify and prove it. Therefore, a scientific theory based on observations of nature within one paradigm can only be justified as objective within that paradigm. For example, consider Newton’s law of universal gravitation. This law cannot be unequivocally proven for all of space and all of time, but it has been verified only within the solar system, with masses, displacements, etc. defined within the paradigm set by a group of scientists. In this way, we can justify the objectivity of scientific knowledge within our paradigm.
We have examined the arguments of Popper and Kuhn by asking the questions: what is science, how are scientific theories established and developed, and how can we justify their objectivity? Popper’s disprovability argues that it is not possible to deduce universal propositions from singular propositions, meaning that no scientific theory can be said to be objective based on a few observations. Kuhn’s paradigm concept argues that we understand nature through research methods, scales of observation, and concepts of phenomena and objects within a paradigm set by a group of scientists.
Using Popper’s and Kuhn’s arguments, I make the following claims. In my opinion, science is the process of understanding the actual objective facts about nature through theories, and the process of doing science is the process of understanding the objective facts about nature through a paradigm, such as the paradigm proposed by Kuhn. The paradigm in this context will be the way science is studied, the direction of research, the scale of observation (unit of measurement), etc. I believe that the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be justified within a paradigm. In support of this claim, I point out the contradictions that arise when one leaves the paradigm, and note that absolute objectivity cannot be derived from observation. Of Popper’s and Kuhn’s arguments, I believe that my argument is closer to Kuhn’s. However, it is not the opposite of Popper’s argument. I agree with Popper’s anti-inductivism, and the justification of the objectivity of scientific knowledge through mere observation is an attempt to justify an infinite number of cases by a few cases. Through this discussion, I hope that scientists will build a more solid paradigm within the scientific community and try to capture more of nature through scientific theories.